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Explaining Stability And Change In Natural Systems
Abstract
An aim of science is to increase our understanding of the natural world. A primary means for doing so is by
providing explanations, which often proceed by tracing the causes of phenomena. How can a causal
explanation lead to understanding? While explanations can take many forms, I argue that to succeed they
must embody a conception of causation shared with their audience. The challenge then, is to describe this
conception and detail its role in explanation. While there is good evidence that scientists employ more than
one causal concept, I argue that the concept of productive causation (centered on the notion of bringing
about change via a connection) has a primary role in natural science explanations. After critiquing other
philosophical accounts, I develop a new theory of productive causation and show how it provides an
underpinning for successful explanations. The heart of the theory is a network of persisting processes that
possess dispositions toward change-producing mutual interactions. I argue that in a good explanation, the
scientific entities, properties and activities invoked will correspond to the theory’s depiction of causal
structure. One important dimension of the theory describes how repeated patterns of interaction can give rise
to a hierarchy of composite processes. This allows the theory to account for stabilized entities at various
spatio-temporal scales. In turn, this enables the approach to be applicable throughout the natural sciences.
After starting with simple examples, I show how the theory deals with more challenging cases from physics to
biology. I conclude that the approach illuminates how explanations of various forms across diverse disciplines
can lead to scientific understanding.
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 1 See Strevens (2013) and Grimm (2006). 
2 See the discussion of target-directed modeling in Weisberg (2013). 
3 Grimm (2006) sees understanding as a “species” of knowledge, responding primarily to Kvanvig (2003) 
who argues they are distinct but sees understanding as factive. Elgin (2007), in contrast, argues scientific 
understanding need not be factive. Strevens’s (2013) account includes the criterion that understanding 
requires a “correct” explanation, allowing a limited role for idealization. Potochnik (2015), on the other 
hand, distinguishes between understanding and truth as epistemic aims of science, and recently (2017) 
elaborates an account of understanding that accommodates ubiquitous idealization. 
4 See discussion below, especially Chapter 3, section 5 and Chapter 4, section 3. I note that some 
approaches to scientific realism rely on realism about causal structure in their formulations. 
5 Here I draw inspiration from work on complex systems due to Simon (1996) and Wimsatt (2007). 
 6 For this reason, difference-making will play the leading role in social science contexts. 
7 In some cases the presence of back-up pathways means a gene is a productive cause but not a difference-
maker with regard to the phenotypic effect (causal preemption). 
8 This is not to say that difference-making relationships can be reduced to productive relationships (see 
discussion in Chapter 2). 

 
9 Here, the type of metaphysics I have in mind is that which theorizes directly about the nature of the actual 
world and other possible worlds using various kinds of evidence, rather than traditional conceptual 
analysis, which would theorize about what is real based on examination of our folk concepts. See Paul 
(2012), p. 15 and Paul & Hall (2013), pp. 2-4. 

 





10 I have substituted “difference-making” for Hall’s “dependence” to connect the discussion to the 
widespread use of the former term. It should be noted Hall himself is not committed to the two concepts 
thesis, continuing to explore avenues toward a unified reductive account. Hall and L.A. Paul concede, 
however, that the prospects are “dim” (Paul & Hall, 2013, p. 249). 
11 Another class of difference-making theories focuses on changes in the probability of one event given 
another, but these approaches share relevant features with counterfactual strategies as it relates to the 
present discussion. Regularity theories (which won’t be discussed at length here) might also be seen as 
difference-making accounts – but ones that also attempt to capture at least part of the notion of production 
with necessitation/sufficiency relations and/or laws taking the place of connections between cause and 
effect (Mackie 1974, Davidson 1967). 
12 Paul & Hall (2013) offer an in-depth review. 
13 Related to this point is the fact that production accommodates the intuition that causation is transitive, 
while difference-making does not (transitivity was stipulated by Lewis in his 1973 paper). 
14 A stumbling block is the need to evaluate these more complex counterfactuals without implicitly 
incorporating causal information (see Paul & Hall, 2013, pp. 111-124). 
15 Although fleshing out a counterfactual theory that handles cases of omission and prevention is also 
problematic (see Paul & Hall, 2013, pp. 212-214). 
16 Here counterfactuals are not being used to analyze causation itself, but to construct a derivative kind of 
causation (Dowe calls it causation*) to cover omissions and preventions (see Dowe, 2000, Ch. 6.). 
17 Some have argued that problems with conceptual analysis reveal a need to change focus to an 
epistemological investigation of causation. See De Vreese (2006) and Williamson (2006, 2013). 
18 See, e.g. Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson (1992) and Baillargeon (1994). 
19 However, as children are able to learn more about mechanisms independently of observation, they will 
encounter conflicts between the spatio-temporal cues present in causal perception and the underlying 
knowledge (for instance in experiments involving unseen apparatuses). In such cases younger children may 
incorrectly follow the evidence from, say, temporal contiguity, while older children (correctly) give priority 
to knowledge of the unseen mechanisms: see Schlottmann (1999), cf. Schultz (1982). This research is 
consistent with the thesis that “perceptual causality could promote rapid acquisition of mechanical 
knowledge” but may also point to the need for cognitive resources that make mechanism learning a 
“separable” process from causal perception (Schlottmann, 2001). 
20 This research approach, which is currently very prominent, is interesting in that a normative framework 
is being deployed toward a descriptive goal. 
21 The causal process theories due to Salmon and Dowe are sometimes referred to as mechanistic, but here I 
am reserving the term for the work of recent authors especially prominent in the philosophy of biology 
(sometimes referred to as the “new” mechanists). 
22 See, for examples, Bechtel (2006), pp. 1-5 (examples from cell biology), and Craver (2007), pp. 2-3 
(neuroscience). 
23 An exception here is Glennan’s (1996) approach that attempted to analyze causation in terms of 
mechanisms. But this account ultimately relied on an unanalyzed notion of causal law. Glennan (2017) 
recently explores other possible ways of understanding how mechanisms could play this metaphysical role. 
24 For comparison, Glennan (1996, 2002) refers to “parts” and their “interactions” (2002, p. S344), while 
Bechtel prefers to speak of “components” and their “operations” (2006, p. 26).  
25For exploration of the notion of non-specific productive activities, see Machamer (2004), Bogen (2008), 
and Waskan (2011).  
26 See also Glennan (2010), who argues for using two kinds of causation (production and “relevance”) as 
part of the description of mechanisms. 
27 I note that the MDC (2000) article uses the term produce (or cognates) several dozen times to describe 
mechanistic explanation. For further discussion of the new mechanists’ approach, see Chapter 4, section 6. 
28 For a recent example of this kind of argument, see Kaiser (2016). Another potential difficulty for DM 
approaches is the existence of redundant or back-up causes, which are common in biological contexts. In 
such cases, a DM relation may falsely describe the situation—see the discussion in Love & Nathan (2015, 
pp. 766-768). With that said, moving DM relations from the token to the type level may often address the 
issue. 
29 See Dupré (2013). For a defense of the dualism of entities and activities, see Illari & Williamson (2013). 
Franklin-Hall (2016) has recently offered a sharp critique of the theoretical underpinning of mechanistic 
approaches, including the causal notions employed and the process of identifying parts. The Dupré and 
Franklin-Hall critiques are further discussed in Chapter 4, section 6.  
30 See the discussion above of the phenomenon of causal perception. 
31 Difference-making causation might even be used to describe causation in conceivable worlds that differ 
physically from our own, for instance where action-at-a-distance occurs. 
32 I will not be discussing the line of argument that denies that there is such a thing as physical causation – 
famously found in Russell’s “On the Notion of Cause” (1913). Ney (2009) includes a critique of this view. 
For another recent discussion see Frisch (2014). 
33 On this point, critics will note that Salmon’s original process theory (Salmon, 1984) employed 
counterfactuals (see discussion in Chapter 3). 
34 Assigning this role for DM is in keeping with a criticism of extant physical theories of causation—that 
they lack the resources to support “higher-level” explanatory tasks. Critics focus on cases where there may 
be energy/momentum transfer between two objects, but it is irrelevant to explanation (see discussion in 
Chapter 3). 

35 This is since it is “used in a variety of different ways or at least has amorphous boundaries (Woodward, 
2011a, 410).” 
36 Woodward explores the relationships between philosophical theories of causation and psychological 
evidence in his (2012). He begins with the premise that human causal cognition is “fairly successful in 
enabling us to cope with the world”. So, if a normative theory proposes an approach to causal reasoning 
and people do in fact seem to reason in a roughly compatible way, then the theory might help explain “why 
(and to what extent) people are successful causal reasoners (Woodward, 2012, 962-3).” 
37 Some psychologists, dissenting from the approaches to causal inference discussed above, do advance a 
foundational role for notions related to production or mechanisms in causal reasoning. In particular, Ahn & 
Kalish (2000) posit a crucial role for mechanistic beliefs in adult causal inferences, while Wolff (2007) 
argues that subjects represent causes (even involving non-physical factors such as human intentions) in 
terms of force dynamics. On a related note, Strevens (2007) outlines a number of ways in which thinking in 
mechanistic terms is useful to our reasoning. 

38 Some research has suggested an important role for interventions in causal learning in children (see 
Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005, Schulz, Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007). 
39 Also see the strong experimental support for the intuitions of causation in late-preemption scenarios 
discussed in section 3.1 below. 


40 E. coli “produces” the needed enzymes, an active process that begins with the transcription of the lac 
operon genes; the regulatory gene “produces” the repressor protein, which (absent allolactose) “binds” to 
the operator for the structural genes; while allolactose (when present) “binds” to the repressor protein. 
41 Woodward: “A causal relationship is clearly present between the presence of allolactose and the 
production of the enzymes, and the former figures in the explanation of the latter, but there is no transfer of 
energy from, or spatio-temporally continuous process linking, the two (Woodward, 2003, 226).” 

42 A caveat is that all the studies discussed here were conducted under prevailing standards governing 
statistical significance, which have come under greater scrutiny recently. It is not known what the impact of 
even tighter standards would be for these research results. 
43 An alternative explanation considered by Lombrozo and favored by Woodward (2012) is that the varying 
ratings on double prevention had to do with the perceived stability of the causal relation (with the 
intentional/functional causes being viewed as more consistent over counterfactual scenarios). This 
interpretation is perhaps given a boost by the accidental elements that were present in the mechanistic 
scenarios. However, the results are clearly compatible with the idea that the two notions of causation have 
different conditions of applicability. 
44 See, for example, the discussion of Hitchcock’s (2007b) account by Paul & Hall (2103) pp. 205-209. 

45 Illari also identifies a need for an improved theory of production, and in her (2011) explores the idea of 
an account based on the transmission of information. 
46 Absent from this list is a requirement that the theory be reductive. Difference-making theorists have 
shown that illuminating causal explanatory accounts need not include a reduction of causation to non-
causal elements. 

47 A somewhat related approach is the transference theory of causation, an example of which is due to 
David Fair (1979). This approach has generally been seen as less promising than process theory, although 
see Kistler (1998, 2006) for a recent defense. A metaphysical theory with some similar elements to the 
process account is Ehring’s (1997) trope-persistence theory. Ingthorsson (2002) discusses the notion of 
production as interaction in comparison with traditional ideas about causation. 

48 This constructive view of causation’s role in science appears to place Human Knowledge in opposition to 
the arguments of Russell’s own “On the Notion of Cause” from 1913. There, Russell argues that the 
prevailing philosophical notion of cause does not play a role in advanced sciences. The disagreement 
between the two positions might be seen as limited: the later Russell is developing causal notions that better 
suit the practice of science as compared to the traditional concept he criticizes in the earlier article. 
However, the book’s conclusions clearly imply that the earlier paper overreached in its appeal to the use of 
functional relations to dismiss the importance of causation to science (see Russell, 1948, p. 475). 
49 Discussed below, and see Salmon (1984), pp. 138-139. 
50 He also refers to a causal line as a “more or less self-determined causal process (Russell, 1948, 477).” 
51 This portion of the discussion has much in common with that of Russell’s earlier Analysis of Matter 
(1927). 
52 Russell’s last chapter is a critique of empiricism. The relationship of empiricism to the development of 
causal process theories will be discussed below. 
53 In Salmon (1966) he characterizes Russell’s five postulates as an attempt to justify “ampliative” 
inferences. In Salmon (1974) he notes that Russell’s formulation of his postulates constitutes a rejection of 
empiricism, and he characterizes Russell’s reasoning as akin to a Kantian transcendental deduction (a 
difference being that Russell did not insist on the truth of this postulates). 
54 Salmon’s development of the causal process account throughout the period was intertwined with the 
continuing development of the statistical relevance approach. This latter work was not essential to the 
causal process theory, however, and will not be a focus of the present discussion. 
55 Salmon assesses the landscape of accounts of explanation offered by philosophers of science, and sorts 
them according to three conceptions of explanation: the epistemic, the ontic, and the modal. In Salmon 
(1989), he discusses his adoption of this framework, noting debts to articles by J.A. Coffa and D.H. Mellor 
(see Salmon, 1989, p. 118). The launching point for most of the alternatives canvassed was in the form of 
critical responses to the classic Deductive-Nomological (D-N) account made prominent by Hempel 
(Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). The D-N account (informally, the “covering-law” approach) is categorized 
by Salmon as “epistemic” because the combination of laws and initial conditions are used to demonstrate 
that an “event-to-be-explained was to be expected (Salmon, 1984, 16, emphasis original).” 
56 Salmon at times also describes the ontic approach to explanation as a search for “mechanisms” (see 
Salmon, 1984, pp. 123-4). Late in the book he also characterizes his work as an updated version of “the 
mechanical philosophy” (pp. 239-241). 

57 Salmon says that the inspiration for the mark criterion is owed to Hans Reichenbach, who used the notion 
of a mark as an indicator of causal relevance in The Direction of Time (Reichenbach, 1956). 
58 He goes on to say the following: “We shall say, therefore, that the light pulse constitutes a causal process 
whether it is modified or not, since in either case it is capable of transmitting a mark (Salmon, 1984, 142).” 
This notion of being “capable”, however, is potentially problematic, as discussed below. 
59 Note that while a red filter placed at the source will turn the moving spot red at all points, this does not 
constitute a local intervention in the “spot-process” itself (Salmon, 1984, p. 142). 

60 Salmon explains that he was inspired by contemplation of one of Zeno’s paradoxes—that of the flying 
arrow (see Salmon, 1984, pp. 151-3). 
′′
61 Whether Salmon’s formulations can overcome this sort of Humean concern will be discussed in section 3 
below. 
62 The ‘only if’ was omitted by Salmon, but is implied by his discussion. 
63 Salmon says that the need for this was pointed out to him (in conversation) with Nancy Cartwright after a 
discussion of previous formulations (Salmon, 1984, p. 148). 


′′
64 There are a couple of technical issues worth noting: first, the use of “if” instead of “if and only if” was 
deliberate this time—Salmon explains that other characteristics could have been altered in the requisite way 
even if Q and R were not (Salmon, 1984, p. 174); second, CI and MT may seem to offer circular 
definitions, with interactions introducing marks in the MT thesis and the introduction of transmitted marks 
defining interactions in CI. Later (in Salmon 1998), Salmon reformulates the principles of the theory in a 
way that avoids circularity (Salmon was responding to the critique in Dowe, 1992). This involved taking 
care to distinguish causal interactions from intersections, and also clarifying that a mark may be a transient 
feature of intersecting processes: the key for a causal interaction is that the marks persist beyond the 
intersection point. One point of interest in this revised formulation is that it clarifies that the causal 
interaction is logically prior to the causal process in the definitional hierarchy, reversing the order of 
presentation in the 1984 book (see Salmon, 1998, pp. 178-9). 
65 Salmon notes that the formulations could be reworded to leave out a commitment to temporal 
asymmetry. This would leave open the possibility of formulating a causal theory of time. An account of 
causal asymmetry could be developed according to which it is a contingent large-scale feature of the causal 
network. 
66 See Salmon (1984), pp. 180-182. Those familiar with the 1984 book will note that in the present 
discussion I am passing over Salmon’s extensive discussion of the statistically characterized “conjunctive 
fork,” which is linked to Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause. Salmon also sketches a statistical 
characterization of the interactive fork. As Salmon himself later makes clear, these discussions are not 
integral to the causal process account, stating that causal processes and causal interactions “cannot be 
characterized in terms of relationships among probability values alone (Salmon, 1990, 95).” 
67 In another article, Salmon explicitly ties propensities to quantum mechanical phenomena: “My 
suggestion is that the quantum mechanical wave is a wave of propensity (Salmon, 1988, 15).”  
68 Salmon explains he is “borrowing” the term from Larry Wright (Salmon, 1984, p. 269). 
69 In this he also follows Russell, who believed that modern scientific understanding was incompatible with 
the traditional conceptions of physical objects and material substance. See Russell (1948), p. 333. 
70 A further worry (shared by Salmon) concerns whether the account was fully consistent with science, 
particularly in the domain of quantum mechanics. This topic will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
71 In a book review, Ronald N. Giere tersely concludes “the analysis employs counterfactual notions such 
as the capability of transmitting information. Thus Salmon’s analysis runs counter to the empiricist 
tradition going back to Hume (Giere, 1988, 446).”  
72 Fetzer put it this way: “the critical question that arises at this juncture, of course, is whether or not these 
commitments to subjunctives and counterfactuals violate the Humean heritage that Salmon has so faithfully 
articulated heretofore (Fetzer, 1987, 607).” 
73 Another discussion in the same vein is offered for the counterfactual present in CI (Salmon, 1984, pp. 
171-174). 
74 Salmon shows no interest in utilizing a possible-worlds semantics, considering counterfactuals justified 
in such a way as “unsuited for the explication of causality or scientific explanations (Salmon, 1997, 476).” 
75 Kitcher (1989) argues, in fact, Salmon’s whole approach might be re-framed to show that causal 
processes and interactions were only secondary notions, with counterfactuals playing the indispensable role 
in underpinning causation.  

76 Salmon’s formulations don’t even clearly rule out that touching or crossing an empty space-time region 
could be considered an intersection (see Dowe, 2000, p. 74 and Kitcher, 1989, p. 466). 
77 Salmon later claims this is not a problem, but does not offer a detailed discussion (Salmon, 1997, pp. 
464-5). 
78 Elliott Sober had made a similar point in his review of Salmon—see Sober (1987), pp. 253-254.  
79 After presenting his shadow cases, Kitcher considers whether putting more restrictions on the kinds of 
“genuine” properties causal processes can be said to possess would help distinguish them from 
“gerrymandered” cases, but concludes there will be difficulties in doing this in a principled way (a problem 
he thinks parallels the issues raised by Goodman’s new riddle of induction—see Kitcher, 1989, p. 466). At 
one point Salmon argues that a notion he had developed in conjunction with his Statistical Relevance 
theory of explanation would be of use here. The concept was that of an “objectively codefined class” which 
is ”explicated in terms of physically possible detectors attached to appropriate kinds of computers that 
receive carefully specified types of information” about properties of processes (Salmon, 1994, p. 300 and 
see Salmon, 1984, p. 68). While his (brief) description of this criterion would rule out some characteristics 
(including relational properties such as that possessed by the Opera House shadow), it does not appear it 
would rule out counterexamples such as the shadow case discussed in section 3.2 without further 
restrictions on the notion of property (the distorted shape of the shadow would seem detectable—cf. 
discussion in Dowe, 2000, pp. 77-78). It also isn’t clear it avoids a circular appeal to an implicit causal 
notion in its use of “detection”. 
80 See Hitchcock (1995), p.310. This concern can be extended to Salmon’s successor theory which utilizes 
conserved quantities discussed below (see Hitchcock, 1995, p.316). 
81 In a footnote to his discussion of conservation laws in the 1984 book, Salmon references Fair’s (1979) 
proposal to use energy transfer as the basis for an account of physical causation. Dowe (1992) also 
acknowledges the work of Fair (and also Brian Skyrms) when introducing his conserved quantity theory. 
82 Dowe’s fullest treatment was given in his later book, Physical Causation (Dowe, 2000). The book 
includes a detailed exploration of how causal interactions and processes underpin the analysis of cause and 
effect in a wide variety of scenarios. A particularly controversial aspect of this work was Dowe’s attempt to 
analyze omissions and preventions in light of his theory (see Dowe, 2000, Ch. 6). 
83 This version is from Dowe (2000), p. 90. It differs from the 1992 version only in that Dowe replaces the 
term “manifests” with “possesses.”  
84 These were refined subsequent to the 1994 paper. The definitions here are from Salmon (1997). 

85 The importance of objects for Dowe can also be seen by noting that in his formulation, causation could 
also be described in terms of them: objects that possess conserved quantities would be causal objects, while 
those that do not could be labeled pseudo-objects. A causal process would be then be derivatively defined 
as the worldline of a causal object (see discussion in Dowe, 2008). Also, because of this formulation, Dowe 
is willing to say that “an earlier segment of a causal process may be a cause of a later segment; and some 
feature of a causal process may be the cause of another feature (Dowe, 1992, 211).” Salmon, taking causal 
processes as basic units, would disagree with such statements. 
86 See Salmon (1984), p. 132 and Salmon (1978), p. 700. 
87 Dowe assumes that quantities must be universally conserved and cannot just be defined as those constant 
within closed system. A proposal regarding how the notions of conservation laws, conserved quantities and 
closed systems should be best construed for the purposes of the causal theory can be found in Choi (2003). 
88 See McDaniel (2002), p. 261 for discussion of this point. 
89 Handfield (2010) poses this question. 
90 See Salmon (1984), pp. 185-190, and Dowe (2000), pp. 18-26. 
91 Dowe responds by claiming that as far as we know the appropriate conditions hold in the actual world 
(Dowe, 2000, p. 97). This response arguably doesn’t do justice to the complexity of the issue. Failure of the 
symmetries to hold for the purposes of defining causality locally may result from the character of distant 
and unobservable reaches of the universe. Also see Hoefer (2000) for an argument that there is no principle 
of energy-momentum conservation in General Relativity. 
92 For Dowe’s discussion of empirical analysis and its difference from conceptual analysis, see Chapter 1 of 
Dowe (2000). For criticism see Hausman (2002), and Koons (2003). 
93 See, e.g., the discussion in Woodward (2003), pp. 354-6. 
94 It is also worth noting that despite its ambition to improve on the mark-transmission account in this 
regard, the CQ theory still faces counterexamples regarding pseudo-processes. See Hitchcock (1995) and 
Choi (2002). 
95 The recent volume entitled The Oxford Handbook of Causation includes a chapter on process theories 
(authored by Dowe) under the section heading of “Standard Approaches to Causation” alongside four other 
such chapters (Beebee, Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009). 
96 This is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, which holds that the only real entities are human 
sensations (see Salmon, 1984, p. 5). 

97 In an earlier paper, Salmon originally interpreted the case as one of inference to a common cause. Van 
Fraassen (1980) criticized this: at best one can only infer similar causes, not the very same cause (p.123). 
Salmon then revised his interpretation to provide for physically distinct causes that nevertheless arose from 
common “background conditions” (1984, p. 226). A discussion of this topic with similarities to Salmon’s is 
in Cartwright (1983), pp. 83-86. 
98 He refers to this as “statement empiricism,” which is distinguished from “concept empiricism” (Salmon, 
1984, p. 230). 
99 Salmon says he agrees with Cartwright (1983) regarding her similar argument that “inference from effect 
to cause is legitimate” in such situations (Salmon, 1984, p. 233). Salmon also cites Ian Hacking’s (1981) 
analysis of microscopes, quoting at length from Hacking’s discussion of the use of an engineered 
microscopic grid (pp. 235-6). Indeed Salmon’s thinking shows a strong affinity to Hacking’s advocacy of 
“entity” realism set forth in the latter’s (1983). 
100 Kitcher (1989), pp. 475-77. 
101 Salmon’s theory would then be subject to criticisms similar to those lodged against certain agency and 
manipulationist theories of causation (see discussion in Woodward, 2009, pp. 25-28). 
102 In a later paper, Salmon shows a way to formulate the mark-transmission theory without explicit 
counterfactuals but with a provision stating “A causal process is a process that can transmit a mark 
(Salmon, 1998, 299).” 
103 It seems clear that merely moving to alternative terminology (invoking, say, “information”) cannot offer 
a path out of the dilemma. 
104 For reasons of space I do not discuss Kantian approaches to responding to the empiricist dilemma. 



105 In addition to its normative role, the theory also has a modest descriptive dimension: the account is 
intended to be broadly compatible with causal explanatory accounts offered by scientists. This 
compatibility is relatively straightforward to establish in cases where the explanation features the causal 
properties of interacting entities. In other cases the connection will be more indirect. The kinds of examples 
that are the focus of recent literature on mechanistic explanation are of special interest, and will be 
discussed below (section 6). 
106 See Salmon (1984), p. 19. In his (1989), Salmon clarifies that there are two acceptable ways to interpret 
the ontic conception: either explanations exist concretely in the world, or an explanation consists of a list of 
sentences or propositions that “report” the relevant worldly facts (p. 86). 
107 See Salmon (1984), p. 16, and Hempel (1966), p. 48. 
108 See discussion in Craver (2014). Also see Potochnik (2016, 2017), who emphasizes the communicative 
and cognitive aims of explanation. 
109 The terminology of “ontic” and “epistemic” constraints (inherited from the literature) is not optimal, 
since understanding is an epistemic achievement primarily in virtue of meeting the “ontic” constraint, while 
the “epistemic” constraint has more to do with the cognitive aspects of understanding. Below, I focus on 
the nature and role of the ontic (worldly) constraint, but will continue to refer to “epistemic” constraints (or 
virtues/norms) as a catch-all for the other considerations that facilitate understanding in the cognizing 
audience. 
110 It should be kept in mind when speaking of a “causal structure responsible for a phenomenon” that this 
can have two dimensions. The etiological aspect concerns identifying antecedent causes of the 
phenomenon, while the constitutive aspect concerns the causal network comprising a phenomenon. 
111 The close relationship between models and explanations is explored by Rohwer & Rice (2016). 
112 The other type of fidelity criteria concern dynamical fidelity: this has to do with how well the model 
produces an output similar to the real world system (see Weisberg, 2013, p. 41). 
113 As in the case of “Galilean” idealization – see Weisberg (2013), p. 99. 
114 It can be debated how faithfully the elements of a good explanation must represent the target. As 
discussed further below, what is important in the present approach is that elements correspond to features 
of the world’s causal nexus, even if these elements are highly distorted by idealization. This is similar to 
Potochnik’s idea that idealizations can “play a positive representational role” and can “stand in for 
significant causal influences (Potochnik, 2017, 52).” 
115 One caveat in this discussion concerns whether it is presumptuous to assume that the constraint must be 
conceived of in terms of actual causal structure. Philosophers wary of realism about causation may want to 
interpret the ontic constraint as another form of epistemic constraint (perhaps properly labeled “meta-
epistemic” given its structuring role). Perhaps more importantly, scientists may also have varying levels of 
commitment to the causal character of the target phenomenon vs. the epistemic value of, e.g., representing 
it as if it were a causal mechanism. This and related issues are discussed in Matthewson & Calcott (2011) 
and Levy (2012). For present purposes I will assume practitioners do assume phenomena have actual 
causes and in light of this are seeking specifically causal explanations. 
116 Generality has to do with “the invocation of categorical claims regarding classes” of the elements of 
explanation, while systematicity has to do with “specification of some principle of extrapolation for 
applying an explanation to multiple cases (Sheredos, 2016, 922)”. I focus on the notion of generality in the 
text (and also greatly simplify the detailed discussion in the article).  
117 See Sheredos (2016), p. 939. 
118 See Weisberg (2013), 109-110, and the account of the trade-off between precision and generality in 
Mathewson & Weisberg (2009). Note that in these discussions, “intended scope” and “generality” mean 
different things. The former normally refers to the aspects of a real-world system being modelled, while the 
latter has to do with the number of targets to which the model may be applied. 
119 For a related viewpoint, see Glennan (2017). He argues that mechanistic models are typically general in 
nature, but considers real world mechanisms to be particulars. 
120 On this point, it is interesting to look again at the earlier Salmon and Hempel conceptions. This picture 
of the relationship between general explanations and causal structure is a departure from Salmon’s ontic 
conception—he thought concrete regularities in the world’s causal structure were explanatory (although his 
causal theory only defined a singular network). On the other hand, the testability of the statements in a 
(general) explanation is a requirement of Hempel’s conception (along with the “expectation” criterion 
mentioned above – see Hempel, 1966, pp. 47-49). 

  
121 See Martin (2008), especially Ch. 5. The mutual manifestation idea stands in contrast to a traditional 
account where an object is said to possess a disposition for a characteristic manifestation in condition C 
(but may not manifest or else may have a different manifestation in condition C`). Mutual manifestation 
(which can involve many partners) takes the place of a reference to conditions. I should note that Martin 
usually describes a single disposition as capable of myriad mutual manifestations with different pairings of 
reciprocal partners: a disposition, considered in this way, he sometimes calls a “readiness line” or a “power 
net” (p. 47). At other times, however, he describes a cluster of dispositions with particular (mutual) 
manifestations: “quarks have countless dispositions toward countless (nonactual) manifestations (p.50, see 
also p. 54)”. Other theorists who utilize the idea of mutual manifestation (or a similar notion) include Heil 
(2003) and Mumford & Anjum (2011). These theorists generally take single dispositions to be capable of 
multiple manifestations exhibiting a shared character, and don’t distinguish between elementary and macro-
level dispositions.  
 122 By design, there is an etiological but not a constitutive dimension to explanations at the elementary 
level. Also, note these definitions only encompass what Salmon (1984) referred to as X-type interactions. 
He also discussed two other types: Y-type (where a process divides into two or more processes), and λ-
type, where two or more processes fuse. In the present framework, these can only occur at the level of 
composite processes. 

123 As noted in Chapter 3, causal process theory is incompatible with true action-at-a-distance (with no 
mediating particles or fields).  
124 The case of the electro-magnetic field raises the question of whether the notion of transmission still 
makes sense in light of theories which imply continuous interactions. The first option is to understand 
transmission as including the possibility of truly continuous interaction as a limiting case. However, to the 
extent this appears problematic, one can hold to the discrete model by interpreting continuous interactions 
as a theoretical idealization. 
125 Cf. Cartwright (2009): “Causal laws describe what singular causal processes will or can occur under 
specified circumstances whenever the prescribed causes are instantiated (129).” A more detailed 
comparison with the work of Cartwright is in section 5 below. 
126 In a later paper he rejected this formulation in favor of the view that “it is essential to a property that it 
bestow a particular cluster of particular powers (Shoemaker 1998/2003, 412, emphasis added).” 
127 Related to this point Chakravartty (2007) argues for a distinction between abstraction and idealization, 
rather than viewing the former as a kind of idealization (pp. 221-224). 
128 Of course, explanations may have both etiological and constitutive elements (see Salmon, 1984, 270-1). 

129 Andersen (2017) recently has proposed an alternative approach to identifying patterns in the causal 
nexus. She first assumes that the Salmon/Dowe conserved quantity theory describes the causal nexus at the 
microphysical level (and she criticizes the theory for lacking the resources to describe higher level causes). 
Then, she adds the notion of a pattern ontology: identification criteria can be used to pick out (a vast 
number of) possible patterns, any of which can serve as the basis for causal relata. Using a phase space 
representation of the nexus one can define counter-factually robust volumes to serve as the relata – 
Andersen sees a benefit in the potential use of information-theoretic tools to define causal relations between 
such volumes. The approach taken in the present theory differs in that the elementary level causal nexus 
has within it the resources to build a non-arbitrary hierarchy of composites that correspond to the entities 
investigated in the natural sciences. 
130 This idea was first introduced in Simon & Ando (1961), which also presented modelling techniques for 
estimating the time scales over which the independence of the parts can be approximated.  
  
 
131 This discussion of the constitution relationship may be compared to suggestive remarks offered by 
Martin (2004), p. 35. Also, an argument for dispositions based on their role in physical part/whole 
relationships is offered by Hüttemann (2013), section 2. Hüttemann goes on to offer an account of 
causation that has something in common with the present proposal in its combining of dispositions with a 
notion of process. However, the differences are substantial: Hüttemann’s key idea is that “a cause is an 
actual disturbing factor (antidote) to the default process that a system is disposed to display” (p. 116). This 
incorporates the difference-making concept of cause and also requires epistemic/pragmatic factors to define 
default processes. 

132 The biological individuality debate is reviewed by Clarke (2011), who in listing 13 approaches to the 
problem, notes that she deliberately omits a criterion that would define an individual “in terms of the nature 
of its parts, or the kind or amount of interaction that takes place among them (316).” This is because this 
approach, in her analysis, is too general to settle difficult cases. What is needed is more precise 
specification that gives a “theoretical justification for including some kind of interaction but not others 
(316).” 

133 See, e.g. Cartwright (1983), pp. 59-71. For Corry’s discussion, see Corry (2009), pp. 179-184. He goes 
on to argue that scientific analysis, of the sort that has led to the understanding of a broad range of 
phenomena in terms of the behaviors of components, implicitly assumes the 3-fold distinction, and this 
gives us good reason to believe in the existence of such capacities.  
134 Below (section 6), I will make use of the term “capacity” in its sense as a collection of dispositions of 
some shared character (or, equivalently, an aspect of the dispositional profile of a causal process). 


135 From the play Le malade imaginaire, which premiered in 1673 (see Molière, 1985, p. 478). 
136 For a concise review, see Cross (2012). 
137 C.B. Martin’s approach was to propose that properties were simultaneously dispositional and 
qualitative: see Martin (2008), pp. 63-69. The position was also been adopted by Heil (2003) and G. 
Strawson (2008) among others. 
138 For a defense, see Mumford (2009). Mumford considers the objection that since powers/dispositions are 
potencies, there also needs to be a distinct concrete notion of “act” in the world. The response is that it is 
open to the pan-dispositionalist to argue that powers are not mere possibilities, but are concretely real even 
if unactualized. The objector may also then argue that if powers manifest in terms of other powers this 
leads to a regress. Here the response is that there may be a holistic mutual dependence, but not a vicious 
regress (see Mumford, 2009, 98-102). For a collection of articles exploring the debate over pan-
dispositionalism, see Marmodoro (2010). 
139 Such compatibility may be lacking if one adopts a structuralist metaphysics that sees laws and related 
symmetries as fundamental rather than objects and properties. See French (2014) for a recent defense of 
such an approach. 
140 Salmon (1984), p. 147. 
141 Cf. Ehring (1997), who offers an account of causation in which the persistence of tropes plays the 
central role. 
142 See discussion in Chakravartty (2007), Ch. 4. 
143 Mumford & Anjum (2011) also offer an account of causal processes without the discrete 
propagation/transmission feature found in Salmon/Dowe and the present account. In their picture, 
dispositions mutually manifest in a temporally extended way, giving rise to new dispositions and 
potentially new processes (see Mumford & Anjum, 2011, Ch. 5). 
144 Such a disposition seems indistinguishable from a categorical property (cf. Hüttemann, 2013, p. 107). 
145 Dowe’s own account adopts a notion of object identity, but as discussed in Chapter 3, this ultimately 
involves taking object persistence (across changes due to interactions) as basic. 

146 See Salmon (1984), pp. 278-9. 
147See Anscombe (1971). Also, Bogen (2008) examines this approach in the context of mechanistic 
explanation. 


148 While MDC (2000) also discuss hierarchies in mechanisms, their approach differs in that the entities and 
activities involved, including those at the “bottoming-out” level of description, will again be specified by 
the scientist/scientific field with no attempt to connect to a hierarchy in a causal theory (pp. 13-14). 
149 In subsequent work, Glennan revised his views. First, he replaced reliance on laws with a requirement 
that interactions be characterized by Woodward-style “direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations 
(Glennan, 2002, S344).” More recently, Glennan (2017) discusses several options for theorizing about 
fundamental-level mechanisms, including employment of laws but also the possibility of appealing to 
causal powers. But he also questions the idea that one needs to posit any fundamental level. He says the 
idea of a mechanism is classical, and quantum phenomena of superposition and entanglement make the 
idea of fundamental-level mechanisms problematic. His final view is that mechanisms emerge (docohere) 
from the quantum realm in a local, piecemeal fashion and that this supports the pluralistic conception of 
compound mechanisms and their activities (see Glennan, 2017, pp. 184-193). 
150 See Andersen (2012) for a recent examination of the regularity criterion. 
151 “Mechanisms are sought to explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some significant process 
works (MDC, 2000, 2).” 
152 See, e.g. Cummins (1975) and (1983). 
153 In Cummin’s account, the sub-capacities could be the capacities of system components, but he also 
allowed for analysis into sub-capacities which did not correspond to those of component parts. See 
Cummins (1983), pp. 28-9. 
154 Craver (2007) explains that an explanandum phenomenon may be complex and “multi-faceted (125, 
emphasis original).” Also “the explanation should encompass “multiple features of a phenomenon, 
including its precipitating conditions, manifestations, inhibiting conditions, modulating conditions, and 
non-standard conditions (139).” In the present interpretation, this means the explanation should account for 
a collection of related dispositions toward mutual manifestations. 
155Inspired by consideration of the kinds of experimental techniques used to evaluate compositional 
relationships in biological phenomena, Craver (2007) goes on to offer a manipulation/intervention-based 
account of constitutive relevance in the spirit of Woodward’s causal theory (pp. 152-160). 
156 Bechtel (2015) emphasizes the epistemic basis of mechanism boundaries. 
157 Here, the authors use “objects” and “occurrents” in place of “entities” and “activities”, respectively. 
They argue that these terms are more precise (see Kaiser & Krickel, 2016, pp. 10-11). The distinction is not 
crucial for the present discussion. 
158 The authors also criticize using the notion of behavior as the explanandum for constitutive mechanistic 
explanation (see Kaiser & Krickel, 2016, pp. 20-23). 
159 See Glennan (2010), pp. 253-258. 


 160 Dupré mentions the earlier Salmon/Dowe process theories, but makes the familiar complaint that “these 
are firmly grounded in problems in physics, and in ways that greatly limit their applicability to issues in the 
life sciences (Dupré, 2013, 35).” 
161 Dupré includes an insightful point regarding how temporal extension is basic to biological processes, 
and how this isn’t accommodated well by metaphysicians who assume objects or their temporal stages can 
be divided into infinitesimally small slices (see Dupré, 2013, p. 31). 
 
162 In some formulations of the notion of transmission, Salmon specifically required that a mark (or later, a 
conserved quantity) must be present at each space-time point in a space-time interval. For reference, two 
versions of Salmon’s definitions are provided in the appendix. 

163 In fact, from a historical perspective, the advent of general relativity removed what was an apparent 
obstacle for broadly “mechanical” causal theories like Salmon’s. The “action-at-a-distance” that 
characterizes the Newtonian theory of gravity appears to be incompatible with the approach (see Salmon, 
1984, pp. 209-210, 242). 
164 Actually, as noted in Chapter 3, Salmon did face a concern regarding how his theory applied to 
macroscopic objects. For Salmon, a causal process transmits its structure, or remains uniform with regard 
to a characteristic, in the absence of interactions. The proviso regarding the “absence of interactions” raises 
questions, since macroscopic examples of processes (like baseballs) are undergoing incessant interactions 
of one kind or another (e.g. interactions with air molecules). This issue is addressed in the present approach 
by making a distinction between elementary and composite processes. 
165 While I focus on the discussion in Salmon (1984), it should be noted that the later conserved quantity 
theories of Salmon and Dowe (2000) do not address this concern: both of these begin by defining causal 
processes in terms of world-lines of objects (see discussion in Chapter 3, section 5). 
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166 This is common in introductory discussions: see Griffiths (2005), Ch.1. 
167 The general version of the time-dependent equation is iħ ∂Ψ/∂t = ĤΨ, where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian 
operator appropriate for the system. 
168 This is the strategy followed by Albert in his exploration of QM (1992), and in a recent concise 
introductory overview provided by Ney (2013). Griffiths says that the spin case provides “the simplest and 
cleanest context for thinking through the conceptual paradoxes of quantum mechanics (Griffiths, 2005, 
177).” An introductory QM text that begins with an analysis of spin systems is McIntyre (2012). 
169 Observables are mathematically represented by (Hermitian) operators, which perform transformations 
on the state vectors. Eigenvectors of an observable are those vectors left unchanged by the operator, except 
for multiplicative numbers called eigenvalues. Eigenvalues of the operator are the only possible results of a 
measurement of the associated observable. In the example, |z-spin up> and |z-spin down> are the two 
eigenvectors associated with the z-spin observable and what the text labels “spin up” and “spin down” are 
the eigenvalues (actually ±ℏ/2 for a spin-1/2 particle like the electron). If z-spin is measured and the 
system is in either of these eigenvector states, the associated eigenvalue will be found with certainty. 
170 Z-spin and x-spin are so-called incompatible observables which are subject to the uncertainty principle. 
𝑧 − spin up > =  (
1
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1
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171 Finally, while the dynamics of this simple example are not very interesting, it is important to note that 
the evolution in time of the system between preparation and measurement can also be expressed by the 
appropriate version of the Schrödinger equation. 
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172 Here it would generally be more precise to say that the composite system consisting of the electron and 
the detecting instrument ceases its dynamic evolution and the two are jointly observed in a determinate 
state where either {the electron is spin up and the instrument registers “spin-up”} or {the electron is spin 
down and the instrument registers “spin-down”} with 50% probability (see Ney, 2013, pp. 22-24). But 
where exactly the line between systems should be drawn in the context of quantum measurement is not 
defined by the theory itself: see discussion in section 3 below. Note that immediately following the 
measurement, the state of the system will be represented by the vector associated with the measurement 
outcome, and this state will resume a dynamical evolution in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. 
173 “EPR” here refers to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, who described an example of this type in an article 
authored in 1935. 
174 Experiments on entangled particles have been carried out since the 1970’s with increasing refinement. A 
recent and compelling result is presented in Hensen, et al. (2015). 
175 At one point Salmon tentatively speculates that relativistic quantum field theories, notably quantum 
electrodynamics as depicted by Feynman, might comport somewhat better with the causal process 
conception, but the case for this is not made very clearly (see Salmon, 1984, pp. 255-256). The present 
discussion will be limited to non-relativistic QM. As a result, the discussion below includes some 
inconsistencies in that it combines references to space-time with discussion of time qua external parameter 
in the QM context. 
176 If we turn from the Hilbert space formalism to the wave function representation, then it is true that the 
position of a one-particle system is a function on a 3D space, but as discussed above this is not the case for 
multi-particle systems, where the required dimensions total 3N. 

• 
• 
• 
• 
177Also, it is important to keep in mind that for more elaborate experimental settings the causal interaction 
is not necessarily just between a process corresponding to the quantum system and one corresponding to a 
detector plate or instrument pointer: the interaction may be with the entire (effectively isolated) apparatus. 
178 Salmon goes on to say that his comments must be distinguished from an endorsement of the propensity 
interpretation of the probability calculus, which is a different claim (Salmon, 1984, pp. 204-5). 
179 Cartwright (1989) thinks Salmon’s notion of propagating causal processes is best viewed in terms of 
their possessing a capacity. She uses this characterization of Salmon’s view as part of an analysis of 
quantum mechanical phenomena (pp. 243-250). 
180 The other views discussed in some depth by Suárez are those of Margenau (1954), and Maxwell (1988). 
Redhead (1987) also includes a brief discussion of the propensity interpretation (pp. 48-9), while Dorato 
(2007) surveys the application of notion of dispositions in several interpretations of QM (see also the 
discussion in sections 4.3 and 4.4 below). Suárez (2004b) discusses Popper’s unsuccessful attempt to show 
that a propensity interpretation of probability would resolve the mysteries of quantum phenomena like the 
two-slit experiment.  
181 There are other details to the Suárez account that I am passing over having to do with how the 
propensity-properties possessed by the system relate to the QM formalism. These properties are not 
represented by the so-called pure state of the system (as depicted, e.g., in 4.3). Rather a property is 
represented by a mixed state featuring a weighted sum over the eigenstates of the observable in question 
(see discussion in Suárez 2004a). 
𝜓 >
𝑧 − spin up > 𝑧 − spin down >
182 See Von Neumann (1932/1955). 
183 Von Neumann’s account was labeled “orthodox” by Wigner (1963). A recent explication of this 
interpretation (in a broader context featuring the views of Dirac and others) is in Jaeger (2009), pp. 117-
120. Jaeger calls it the “basic” interpretation. I will refer to it as either as orthodox or as Von Neumann’s. 
While many discussions give the so-called Copenhagen interpretation a leading role (sometimes also 
referred to as “orthodox”), this term covers a number of different views, some of which have anti-realist 
flavors. 
184 A philosopher who has endorsed a two-process understanding of QM is Brian Ellis in his Metaphysics of 
Scientific Realism (2009; see pp. 66-69 and 73-84). 
185 The Von Neumann interpretation is often associated with the view that human consciousness plays a 
role in collapse of the wave function. But this is not a necessary component of the interpretation. As Von 
Neumann explains in Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, it is not that subjective 
perception is responsible for collapse, but rather (as discussed in the main text) it is a feature of the theory 
that process 1 can be assumed to take place at the interaction between the quantum system on the one hand 
and a composite consisting of the measuring device and the human observer on the other, or between a 
composite consisting of the system and the device on the one hand, and observer on the other (or indeed the 
cut can be placed at other arbitrary points, such as where light reflected from the device hits the retina of 
the observer). See Von Neumann (1932/1955), pp. 352, 418-421. 
186 See Wigner (1961), pp. 289-98. 
187 There is an interesting interpretation of QM that looks to treat all interactions on an equal footing. This 
is the relational interpretation of QM (Laudisa & Rovelli, 2013). The idea is that when two systems 
interact, the interaction is measurement-like “for” the systems directly involved, but only results in 
correlations when considered relative to a further system. The price to be paid is the loss of the notion that 
state descriptions and interactions have a fully objective character. 

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

188 Named for Hugh Everett III, who first advocated the view in his 1957 doctoral thesis. 
189 Named after David Bohm. The original exposition is in Bohm (1952). 
190 The family of “modal” interpretations also involves privileging definite values for a subset of properties 
(see Lombardi & Dieks, 2016). 
191 This is the basis for a potential objection to the theory. See Albert (1992), pp. 100-111, and Ghirardi 
(2016), section 10. 
192 This had also been suggested by Dorato (2007) and Suárez (2007). 
193 For discussion of the primitive ontology approach, see Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka & Zanghi (2008) and 
Allori (2013). Belot (2012) analyzes options for how the wave function should be interpreted in the 
approach. For advocacy of (pure) wave function ontology, see Albert (1996, 2013) and Ney (forthcoming). 
194 I note that in a later article, Esfeld (2014) takes a different view of the relationship between dispositions 
and flashes than is proposed in the paper discussed here. Instead of being possessed by microsystems, the 
dispositions are viewed as possessed by the global configuration of flashes. In a similar fashion, Egg & 
Esfeld (2015) argues for attribution of dispositions to the (entire) matter density field in the GRWm theory. 
195 Bell (1987) includes a helpful discussion of the theory. Also see Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghi (1992) and 
the overview provided by Goldstein (2017). 
196 To replicate the probabilistic outcomes of QM, certain assumptions about initial conditions must be 
made (See Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghi, 1992). 
197 Goldstein & Zanghi similarly write that “from a fundamental point of view, the only genuine Bohmian 
system in a Bohmian universe—the only system you can be sure is Bohmian—is the universe itself, in its 
entirety (Goldstein & Zanghi, 2013, 94).” 
198 The procedure for assigning an “effective” or “conditional” wave-function to a subsystem corresponding 
to the measured system is discussed in Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghi (1992), section 5 (also summarized in 
Goldstein, 2017, section 8). 
199 Specifically, Dorato (2007) associates irreducible dispositions with Bohr’s interpretation, the relational 
interpretation (see footnote 187), and GRW. 
200 The holistic nature of the guidance provided by the universal wave function motivates Esfeld, 
Lazarovici, Hubert, & Dürr (2014) to argue that in attributing a dispositional ontology to Bohmian 
mechanics, the disposition is properly seen as a property of all the particles together at a given time. Dorato 
(2015), however, offers reasons to prefer a position closer to that of Suárez (2015). 
201 Recently, the idea of adding a primitive (mass density) ontology to the scheme has also been proposed 
by Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka & Zanghi (2011).  
202 See Bacciagaluppi (2016). Other difficult issues remain, including how to justify that the quantum state 
should be thought of as representing a collection of worlds, and how probability can have any meaning if 
all outcomes are always realized. For an overview see Saunders (2010) and Vaidman (2016). For a 
thorough defense of the Everettian position, see Wallace (2012). 
203 In Dorato’s assessment, dispositions would be eliminable when a local “world” is considered, although 
he also suggests that dispositions could be seen as playing a role at the level of the universe (Dorato, 2007, 
p. 264). 
204 Compared to other sciences, universality is typically taken as a core theoretical goal of physics. On the 
other hand, when it comes to QM (in all of its interpretations), there is still no incorporation of gravity. So, 
perhaps taking a particular stance on QM based primarily on the thesis of global applicability will prove 
premature. 
205 For discussion of this point, see Maudlin (2010). 
206 For a recent argument on these lines, see Frisch (2014). 
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207 The ‘only if’ was omitted by Salmon, but is implied by his discussion. 
 ′
 ′
 
• A process is something that displays consistency of characteristics 
• A mark is an alteration to a characteristic of the process that occurs in a 
single local intersection. 
• A mark is transmitted over an interval when it appears at each space-time 
point of that interval, in the absence of causal interactions. 
• A causal interaction is an intersection in which both processes are marked 
and the mark in each process is transmitted beyond the locus of the 
intersection. 
• A causal process is a process that can transmit a mark. 
  


208 Lewis recognized that most molecules have some hybrid character (Lewis, 1916, p.767). 
209 Ironically, quantum theory appears to solve one problem with the Lewis model from the perspective of 
classical electrostatics. This is the question of why electrons would be localized in pairs given the repulsive 
force between them. The understanding of how quantum spin impacts multi-electron systems explains why 
opposite-spin electrons are found in proximity to each other. Unfortunately this “help” is overwhelmed by 
the other revisionary features of QM, as discussed in the main text. 
𝜓 = 𝐸𝜓
210 Equivalently, one can use the product of Ψ and its complex conjugate Ψ*. 
211 The assumption required here is that the potential energy of the system does not change with time. 
212 I follow the convention of using the lower-case ψ for the time-independent equation, since it represents 
only the spatial dependence of Ψ after applying the separation of variables method to the time-dependent 
Schrödinger equation. 
213 The domain of the wave function for an N-particle system is a configuration space with 3N dimensions. 
214 While the non-localizability of electrons will be the focus of the discussion, there is another feature of 
quantum mechanics that is inconsistent with the classical picture. Particles of the same type, which may at 
times be investigated separately in practice (i.e. described using separate wave functions), are 
indistinguishable in principle when part of a single system (described using a single wave function, as in 
the case of a multi-electron atom or molecule). Here, if the position and spin values of two particles are 
swapped, there will be no empirical consequences: in particular, |ψ|2 is unchanged. There are two ways this 
indistinguishability can be reflected in terms of the composite wave function: it can be unchanged 
following the swap or it can change sign (ψ→ -ψ). In other words the wave function is said to be symmetric 
or anti-symmetric with regard to the particle interchange. These two possibilities describe the two families 
of particles, bosons and fermions, respectively (in alignment with their division into integer-spin and ½-
integer-spin types). The fact that electrons in particular are fermions, and therefore have wave functions 
that are anti-symmetric with regard to their interchange, is crucial for understanding the structure of atoms 
and molecules. This is because two electrons with the same spin values cannot occupy the same point in 
space (because in that case an interchange would leave the wave function unchanged). This consequence 
underlies the so-called Pauli exclusion principle, whereby only two electrons may occupy the same orbital, 
and they must have opposite spins. 
215 See Pauling (1960). 
216 See discussion in Hendry (2008), section 3. 
217 One feature which figured in these efforts from the beginning is the Born-Oppenheimer approximation: 
all calculations start with the assumption that the nuclei are in a fixed configuration (which can be altered 
iteratively to find the best solution). 
218 For discussion of VB and MO models, see Weisberg (2008), sections 2 - 4. See also Woody (2012) for 
discussion of the interplay of chemical concepts and representations with the development of various 
quantum mechanical methods. 
219 The focus here is on so-called ab initio MO calculations. Historically, various semi-empirical methods 
have been very important as well, given limitations on computational resources. Another family of models 
utilizing Density Functional Theory (DFT) is also frequently employed. These models estimate functions 
on the electron density distribution to extract information about energy and other molecular properties. 
220 Hendry also discusses another objection to the conception, which is that valence structural descriptions 
appear to be inapplicable to some molecules. Hendry argues that this wouldn’t vitiate the applicability of 
the structural conception for “paradigm nonpolar substances (Hendry, 2008, 918).” 
∇221 Also known as QTAIM (for “quantum theory of atoms in molecules”): See Bader, 1990, and expositions 
by Bader & Matta (2013), Gillespie & Popelier (2001, Ch. 6-7), Popelier (2000, 2014, 2016), Matta & 
Gillespie (2002) and Matta & Boyd (2007). The term quantum chemical topology (QCT) has been used 
recently to describe AIM along with additional ideas for applications of topological analysis that go beyond 
those originally encompassed by AIM (see Popelier, 2014, pp. 273-4). 
222 See further discussion in section 4 below. 
223 Gradient paths are thus everywhere orthogonal to contour lines of equal electron density. Note also that 
further details can be found by examining the second differential operator or Laplacian ∇2(𝜌). The 
Laplacian is interpreted as indicating local concentration and depletion of charge density, and can be used 
to identify (imperfect) analogues of localized electron pairs (see Bader, 1990, Ch. 7, Popelier, 2000, Ch. 8, 
and Gillespie & Popelier, 2001, Ch. 7). 
224 Technically, the maxima associated with nuclei are not true critical points due to discontinuities, but 
AIM proceeds to treat them as such as a practical matter (see Bader, 1990, p. 19). 
225 Bader insists this topological definition of an atom also identifies a true quantum physical atom (see 
discussion in section 3). 
226 This surface is also referred to as a zero-flux surface, in that no gradient vectors of charge density cross 
it at any point (see Bader, 1990, pp. 28-29). 
227 0.001 a.u. is a practical estimate of the van der Waals envelope around the molecule (Popelier, 2000, p. 
43). 
228 The bond critical point is the minimum on the gradient paths connecting to the nuclei (the bond path), 
but is a maximum in the perpendicular directions along the interatomic surface. 
229 Part of the AIM approach is to look closely at the characteristics of the BCP’s and neighboring topology 
to show how they correspond with various types of bonds. 
230 The notion that a region of electron density provides the “glue” or “cement” holding atoms together in a 
molecule is widespread in chemical texts, presumably for its heuristic value in some contexts (e.g. Loudon, 
1995, p. 36; Shusterman & Shusterman, 1997, p. 774). This provides the backdrop for Bader’s comment. 
231 Popelier (2000) includes a discussion of this distinction (pp. 60-61). 
232 The Hellmann-Feynman theorem generally describes how the wave function and energy of a system 
changes with respect to a change in a parameter that appears in the Hamiltonian (see Atkins & Friedman, 
1997, pp. 182-183). When the parameter in question is the nuclear position coordinate, one obtains the 
result that the force on a nucleus “is the sum of the Coloumbic forces exerted by the other nuclei and by the 
electron density distribution ρ (Gillespie & Popelier, 2001, 134).” See also Bader (1990), pp. 315-322. 
233 This is discussed by Gillespie & Popelier (2001), pp.134-36. See also Bader (1964). Note that this work 
long pre-dates the AIM theory. 
234 This electrostatic picture of how bonding is achieved as atoms are brought together has been challenged 
by a competing theory of the bonding process. As described recently by Needham (2014), primarily 
referencing the work of Ruedenberg and colleagues, this alternative uses a variational analysis to infer that 
changes in electronic kinetic energy play an important role. Bader has responded to this line of theorizing 
(Bader, 2011, pp. 27-29). 
235 Popelier discusses his and Bader’s (somewhat confusing) use of the word “attractive” to describe the 
restorative forces at work in any displacement from equilibrium separation: it is to be distinguished from 
“attracting” (net) forces that bring two atoms together (Popelier, 2000, pp. 55-56). 
236 Also note that even in the above discussion of binding in terms of electrostatic forces, the forces apply to 
nuclei, not atoms. 
237 Bader is consistent in using this characterization, stressing in his 1990 book that “a bond path is not to 
be understood as representing a ‘bond,’” rather “the presence of a bond path linking a pair of nuclei implies 
that the corresponding atoms are bonded to one another (Bader, 1990, 35)”. In a 2009 article, he objects to 
critics who interpret his intention as that of identifying the bond path with a traditional concept of a bond, 
even taking them to task for failing to note that “bond” is a noun, while “bonded” is a participial adjective 
(Bader, 2009, p. 10391). It would seem there is room for some misunderstanding, given that “bond path” 
features a noun, and the visual representations of bond paths and molecular graphs are suggestive of 
traditional structural diagrams. 
238 On the other hand, it should be emphasized that because bond paths don’t fulfill the envisioned 
functional role, AIM is consistent with the conclusion that the structural conception as defined above fails 
to survive the transition to a quantum physical understanding of chemistry. 
239 Bader uses Li in LiF, LiO, and LiH as an example (Bader, 1990, p. 135). Gillespie and Popelier (2001) 
also argue for the usefulness of these calculations (pp. 153-4). 
240 Poplier (2000, 2016) gives a concise account of AIM’s derivation of atomic energies. In response to 
some criticism of the approach (e.g. Anderson, Ayers, & Hernandez, 2010), Popelier concedes that it is not 
ruled out that some molecular fragments, which are not AIM’s topological atoms, may also have a well-
defined energy. As a result, he asserts that “all topological atoms are quantum atoms, but not all quantum 
atoms are topological atoms (Popelier, 2016, 37).” One of the limitations of AIM’s approach to energy 
calculations is that it only applies at equilibrium. Alternative methods of partitioning energy which relax 
this assumption are discussed by Popelier (2016, p. 38). Blanco, Pendas & Francisco (2005) develop an 
approach (labeled “interacting quantum atoms” or IQA) that allows for partitioning into both intra and 
inter-atomic energies. Other work toward extending the AIM research program is described by Shahbazian 
(2013a). 
241 Bader’s arguments that quantum mechanical principles apply to AIM’s atoms is given in Bader (1990), 
Chs. 5, 6 & 8. An important part of these is a derivation based on Schwinger’s principle of least action 
(Ch.8). 
242 There are challenges to AIM in the chemistry literature that claim that the association of bond 
paths/BCP’s with stabilizing interactions is flawed based on an examination of cases (e.g. Poater, Solà & 
Bickelhaupt, 2006). The present discussion is limited to arguing that this notion is conceptually central to 
the theory. 
243Pendás, Francisco, Blanco & Gatti (2007), extending the IQA analysis mentioned in footnote 240, use 
their approach to analyze the nature of BP-signaled bonding. Taking advantage of the fact that their 
approach treats interatomic energies explicitly compared to the manner of the original AIM theory, they 
conclude that bond paths “signal the existence of preferred or privileged exchange channels in molecules 
(Pendás, Francisco, Blanco & Gatti, 2007, 9370).” 
244 See Weisberg, Needham & Hendry (2011, sec. 4.3). Bader’s response to this example is in his (2009). 
Another criticism was recently offered by Foroutan-Nejad, Shahbazian & Marek (2014), who emphasize 
the fact that bond paths may disappear/re-appear due solely to nuclear vibrations in some cases. They also 
note that atoms in molecules that are not linked by bond paths may also be seen as interacting, and AIM’s 
indirect manner of characterizing the differing nature of these interactions leaves the theory open to 
“controversies” (p. 10149). 
245 See Bader (2009) and (2011): “This definition… transcends all bonding schemes and categories and 
provides a unified physical understanding of atomic interactions (Bader, 2011, 20).” Note Bader died in 
2012. 
246 This is true even of a minimalist energetic account. For example, Berson (2008) argues there are cases 
where covalent bonding leads to energetic destabilization. 

𝜓 ∗ 𝜓𝑑𝑟
𝜓 ∗ (1, 2, … , 𝑁)𝜓(1, 2, … , 𝑁)𝑑𝑟𝑖
247 One may also estimate ρ based on results from a scattering experiment. This is discussed immediately 
below. 
248 The notation in this discussion follows that of Veszprémi & Fehér (1999). For Bader’s equivalent 
presentation, see Bader (1990), p. 6. 
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249 This is not a probability density function, since it sums to N rather than one. If one integrates the 
expression over the entire space, one will recover the number of electrons, as expected. 
250 See Gillespie & Popelier (2001), p. 62. 
251 Bader and Zou (1992) discuss how ρ can be linked to an operator, ?̂?, that meets Dirac’s definition of a 
quantum mechanical observable (pp. 43-55). This operator is defined as a function of the position operator: 
?̂?(𝑟) =  𝛿(?̂? − 𝑟). Its eigenstates are the same as the position operator, but with eigenvalues that are delta 
functions at each coordinate. The expectation value for this operator will indeed be the density at each 
position. This result does not alter the argument of the main text, however, because even if ?̂? is an 
observable, its expectation value is not something that is observed. As always, the expectation value is a 
probabilistic assessment of the outcome of a particular measurement. Bader (2009) also defines a “bond 
path operator” based on this density operator, and the present discussion applies to this notion as well, since 
the bond path itself is again the expectation value for the operator. 
252 See Bader (2005), pp. 821-822 and Bader (2010), pp. 2-3. It may be that the use of classical EM physics 
as licensed by the Hellman-Feynman theorem plays a role in inspiring this interpretation. 
253 “The charge density ρ(r) is the fundamental property measured in a coherent X-ray scattering 
experiment (Bader, 1990, 8).” Elsewhere authors have referred to electron density as “a real, measurable 
property (Veszprémi & Fehér, 1999, 185),” or a “measurable quantity (Bader & Matta, 2013, 255).” 
Gillespie and Popelier call electron density “a real observable property (Gillespie & Popelier, 2001, 82),” 
while Matta and Gillespie say it can be “observed by electron diffraction and X-ray crystallography (Matta 
& Gillespie, 2002, 1141).” In addition to the X-ray diffraction case discussed in the text, I note that Bader 
has also claimed that his interpretation is consistent with results from atomic force microscopy (Bader & 
Matta, 2013). Hettema (2013) has responded by asserting that alternative explanations are possible (p. 319). 
254 The latter term is used by Tsirelson & Ozerov (1996), Ch. 3. 

255 See Tsilerov & Ozerov (1996), pp. 85-87. 
256 I note that Hettema (2013) includes a brief objection to the idea that ρ can be considered an observable, 
saying “electronic densities are not directly empirically accessible, but rather correspond to observables 
that are the result of a more convoluted operational procedure (318-319).” In a reply to Hettema, 
Shahbazian counters that ρ shares with other quantum observables such as spin the characteristic of needing 
complicated experimental procedures to measure (Shahbazian, 2013b, p. 332). However, for present 
purposes this exchange does not address the key point. Many objects are difficult to observe, and scientists 
employ complex indirect methods to do so (this is true for both microscopic and macroscopic cases – the 
use of gravitational lensing in astronomy is an example). But the transition from a quantum description of a 
system in Hilbert space to locations and structures in familiar three dimensional space is a distinctive and 
controversial element in discussions of chemistry’s foundation in physics. So the concern is not the 
complex indirect estimation techniques involved in estimating ρ, the objection is to any inference that this 
estimation confers a status as something present in space. 
257 For an argument that canonical QM cannot support the concept of (classical) molecular structure, see 
Primas (1981). 
258 See Hendry (2010) for a critical examination of the prospects for inter-theoretic and ontological 
reduction. For a discussion of AIM in the context of Bader’s reduction claim, see Hettema (2013). 
259 It should be noted that this suggestion has some similarities to other discussions of how molecular shape 
can be accounted for given QM. In several articles, Woolley has argued that new ideas are needed to 
understand the genesis of structures for polyatomic molecules given the possibility of isomerism (see, e.g., 
Woolley, 1991, 1998 and Sutcliffe & Woolley, 2012). Woolley suggests that perhaps environmental 
interactions play a role in the emergence of classical-like molecular structures from a quantum mechanical 
basis (Woolley, 1991, p. 42). Also, Ramsey (1997) emphasizes the link between molecular shape and 
experimental contexts. But in trying to develop these ideas, one is typically led back to the problem of 
interpreting or modifying quantum mechanics. Scerri (2011, 2013) has recently proposed that decoherence 
theory offers the prospect for addressing the problem Woolley has emphasized. However, it appears to be 
accepted in QM interpretation debates that decoherence theory on its own doesn’t provide true 
measurement-like outcomes (see Bacciagaluppi, 2016). Also, see Fortin, Lombardi, Camilo & González 
(2016) for a discussion of the specific problem of optical isomerism and its link to the problem of quantum 
measurement.  
260 Recall that in this scheme, Schrödinger evolution corresponds to propagation of causal processes 
between these interactions. 
261 The implication is that collapses occur in the position basis. This is another commitment of GRW-type 
theories: the outcome of any measurement of non-position properties we observe is always via the position 
of some macro-sized detection device which has established a correlation with the measured system. 
262 “The fact that localization width [in the original GRW model] is large compared to the dimensions of 
atoms (so that even when a localization occurs it does very little violence to the internal economy of an 
atom) plays an important role in guaranteeing that no violations of well-tested quantum mechanical 
predictions is implied by the modified dynamics (Ghirardi, 2016, Sec. 5).” 
263 Note that any simplifying or idealizing approximations used in the calculation of a wave function for an 
atom or molecule carry over to the electron density distribution. 
264 A functional group may correspond to an intermediate-level pattern in a similar way. 
265 It is unclear whether this interpretation of ρ creates a problem for the formal aspects of the AIM theory: 
one concern is whether it is still appropriate for the interatomic surface to be physically interpreted as a 
zero-flux boundary (as required for the quantum mechanical derivations in the full AIM theory). 
266 The notation here follows Coppins (1997). 
𝐼(𝐊) = |∫ 𝜌(𝑟) exp(𝑖𝐊 ∙ 𝑟) 𝑑𝑟|
2
𝐴(𝐊) =  ∫ 𝜌(𝑟) exp(𝑖𝐊 ∙ 𝑟) 𝑑𝑟
𝐴(𝑲) =  ?̂?[𝜌(𝑟)]
267 Here ψ is the electronic wave function, which in the elastic case is unchanged in the interaction. Note 
that while the overall wave function for the system encompasses both the electronic system and the 
radiation field, the scattering amplitudes only depend on the electronic wave function. 
268 In addition to assuming scattering events are independent, this assumes there is no re-scattering (first 
Born approximation). Other idealizing assumptions include ignoring the following factors: interactions 
within atoms/molecules, nuclear vibrations, magnetic field effects, relativistic effects, and any deviations 
from strict polarization and monochromacity in the X-rays (see Coppins, 1997, Ch. 1, and Tsilerov & 
Ozerov, 1996, Ch.3). 
𝜌(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =  
1
𝑉
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐹ℎ𝑘𝑙[exp − 2𝜋𝑖(ℎ𝑥 + 𝑘𝑦 + 𝑙𝑧)
𝑙𝑘ℎ
]
 
269 Notation here follows Rhodes (2006).  
270 A caveat is that the inputs required are amplitude, wavelength and phase of the rays: the first two are 
derived from intensity and position, while phase is not available. Techniques have been developed to infer 
the phase. Of course, this compressed account leaves out the wealth of details regarding experimental 
procedures and estimation processes.  
271 Walsh, Ariew & Matthen (2017) is primarily used to represent the statisticalist position. Earlier articles 
arguing for the view include Matthen & Ariew (2002, 2009), Walsh, Lewens, & Ariew (2002), and Walsh 
(2007, 2010). 
272 This interpretation is introduced by Beatty & Mills (1979) and Brandon (1978). The view is critiqued by 
Bouchard & Rosenberg (2004). See Millstein (2016) for a review. While the concept of vernacular fitness 
will not be discussed at length, some brief comments are included below (section 5). 
273 For discussion of the relationship between the different notions of fitness, see Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 
(2002), Matthen & Ariew (2002), Ramsey (2013) and Sober (2013). 
274 This amounts to modeling in the absence of a specific target. For a recent discussion, see Weisberg 
(2013), Ch. 7. 

275 The other type of fidelity criteria concern “dynamical fidelity”: this has to do with how well the model 
produces an output similar to the real world system (Weisberg, 2013, p.41). 
276 Weisberg describes several varieties of idealization and their purposes. For target-directed models, 
idealizations are primarily motivated by pragmatic considerations or epistemic ones. In the case of 
“minimalist” idealization, the modeler seeks to include in the model only “core causal factors which give 
rise to a phenomenon (Weisberg, 2013, 100).” By featuring the most important causal factors, the model 
can effectively serve explanatory goals. 
277 The dynamical interpretation has also been defended by Stephens (2004, 2010). A recent close 
examination of the analogy is made by Hitchcock & Velasco (2014). 
278 Mechanist frameworks include those of Glennan (1996, 2002) and Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000). 
Skipper & Millstein (2005) critique the applicability of these approaches to natural selection, a debate that 
is taken up by Barros (2008) and Havstad (2011). 
279 Earlier articles defending the statisticalist position, such as Matthen & Ariew (2002) and Walsh, 
Lewens, & Ariew (2002), were in part responding to Sober in developing their arguments. 
280 “The present point is that selection is a force whose effects are calculated in the currency of gene 
frequencies (Sober, 1984, 46).” 
281 Rather than consider natural selection or drift as forces or causes, they are treated as phenomena—types 
of evolutionary change—for which we are seeking an explanation. There is discussion in the literature 
about the need to distinguish between conceptions of natural selection and drift as “processes” vs. 
“products”: see Millstein (2002) and Stephens (2004). Here they will be mainly discussed as products. To 
be sure, the causal explanatory interpretation discussed below is consistent with claiming that MS-models 
describe causal “processes” of selection or drift over time. But the focus here is on the debate between two 
proposals regarding how MS-models can be said to explain evolutionary changes in trait distributions. 
282 See Sober (1984), pp. 49-51. Sober’s view is that an organism’s fitness supervenes on physical 
properties (which are the true causal factors). He also describes the source laws as “physical circumstances 
that can generate fitness differences” (p. 51). In a later article, Sober (2013) argues for a causal role for trait 
fitnesses (as distinct from individual fitnesses). 
283 See Millstein (2006), pp. 629-631. 
284 Reisman & Forber (2005) argue that natural selection is a population-level cause, using manipulation as 
a criterion. Shapiro & Sober (2007) also apply the manipulation criterion for causation in their critique of 
the statisticalist position. For responses, see Walsh (2007, 2010). 
285 For Glennan’s discussion of the two concepts, see Glennan (2009) pp. 327-331. See Chapter 2 for a 
detailed discussion of these concepts and their role in natural science explanations. 
286 See Chapter 3 for a comprehensive review. 
287 In reviewing the possible application of other approaches to mechanistic explanation, Millstein thinks 
they tend to emphasize a “decompositional” framework, and suggests that this emphasis leads to difficulties 
in characterizing selection. See Millstein (2013), pp. 152-153. The distinction is that of an emphasis on 
etiological vs. constitutive causal explanation (notions discussed by Salmon, 1984, pp. 279-80). As 
discussed further below, the case of selection requires the right treatment of both aspects. On the possibility 
that mechanistic frameworks such as Glennan’s (1996, 2002) or that of Machamer, Darden & Craver 
(2000) might be adapted for the case of selection, see Barros (2008). Barros does note the need for a two-
level (population and organism) analysis, although a precise relationship between the two levels is not 
articulated (Barros, 2008, pp. 318-320). 
288 See further discussion of populations as entities in Section 4 below, which highlights Millstein’s own 
causal interactionist population concept. 
289 Millstein considers several examples of mark-transmission (involving a small mark, such as the death of 
a single organism, and a more dramatic mark, such as that caused by a disease spreading through a 
population) and concludes that “mark transmission is not only possible for a population, but commonplace 
(Millstein, 2013, 159).” Millstein does not address Salmon’s stipulation that a mark is transmitted in the 
absence of any further interactions. As a pragmatic matter a population will interact with a variety of 
aspects of the environment on an ongoing basis. The necessary assumption is that these other interactions 
can be ignored since they don’t impact the structural change of interest. See Salmon (1997), p. 464. 
290 This example was featured in Skipper & Millstein (2005). 





291 Millstein (2015) discusses exceptions to this definition. 
292 To clarify, it is not necessary for present purposes to endorse all of the details of Millstein’s account. 
Also, I don’t mean to suggest any one population concept serves all theoretical purposes. I do propose that 
defining a population (at least in part) in reference to survival and reproductive-related causal interactions 
among constituent organisms is appropriate for describing the target system represented by an explanatory 
MS-evolutionary model. Different population concepts may be appropriate in other contexts. For an 
example, see Spencer (2016). For a defense of population pluralism, see Stegenga (2016). 


293 See Crow & Kimura (1970), Ch.1. 
294 See Orr (2009), pp. 531-2. 
∆𝑝 =
𝑝𝑞𝑠
1 − 𝑞𝑠
295 The denominator as presented is equivalent to the mean relative fitness of the population (which often 
appears in in presentations of this formula). See Orr (2009), p. 533. 

296 Here we assume relative fitness is unrelated to frequency, but of course it may not be (frequency-
dependent selection).  
297 Sober (2013) concludes that initial trait frequencies and trait fitnesses are population-level causes. 
However, he applies a difference-making model in conceptualizing the relationship between these causes 
and the effect (change in frequency). 
298 Now we can see how propagation can be associated with change. This was the idea that was not well-
founded in Millstein’s (2013) application of Salmon’s original causal framework (discussed in section 3). 
299 For a sexual species, fitness would incorporate different prospects for mating success. 




300 This is not to say that question of how to define similarity conditions between abstract entities and 
concrete phenomena is an easy one. In his discussion of comparing mathematical models to target systems, 
Weisberg suggests that the target can also be represented abstractly, resolving the concern (Weisberg, 2013, 
p. 95). Regardless of how this question is viewed, it would be untenable to claim that causal features of 
concrete worldly systems can never be abstractly represented. 
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